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1. THE ROLE OF "PRICE-TAKER" SUPPLIERS IN THE OIL MARKET
Analysis of likely developments in the world oil market is ultimately
dependent on some method of forecasting oil supply from key regions.
Unfortunately, data problems tend to dominate work in this area, and much
of the analysis task reduces to making the best use of the limited infor-
mation that is available. Here we report on two alternative approaches
to this forecasting problem, both avowedly data-oriented.
Petroleum exporters need to be grouped into two rough categories.
First, there are what we will call "price-taker" suppliers. This is a
group of petroleum exporters who appear to act as price-takers in the
sense that each takes the world price (which is being set by others)
as given. Each makes supply decisions according to his own parochial
interest, without concern for their impact on the world price. This
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group includes non-OPEC sources of the North Sea, the USSR, China, and
Mexico. It also may include members of OPEC who have low per-capita
incomes such as Algeria, Indonesia, and Nigeria. Second, there is the
"cartel core"--a small group of nations who are the price-makers. This
core includes Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and others on the Arabian Peninsula;
it also may include Iraq, Iran, Libya, and Venezuela. These countries
face a residual demand for world oil, which is the total demand less
that supplied by the price taker exporters.
These groupings are not hard and fast; indeed a major focus of our
inquiry is the circumstance in which a given exporter would change from one
to another camp. The world oil scene is a dynamic interplay among these
importers and suppliers wherein the oil price is set by the members of the
cartel core, who assume the task of controlling oil production so it does
not outstrip the world demand forthcoming at that price.
In this paper our focus is on the price-takers. And, since the
desired form of a supply function depends on its intended use, we begin with
a brief look at the broader market studies for which these supply
analysis methods are designed. The structure of the overall study is shown
in Figure 1; the figure also is a simple flow diagram of the simulation
model framework we are using to tie the various pieces of work together.
The heart of the project is the supply and demand studies shown in the
middle of the figure. These studies seek to improve our understanding
of the fundamental market forces, and to provide estimates of supply functions
for price-taker suppliers and demand functions for importers. These functions
are then incorporated into a simulation model of overall market performance.
An overview of the research method, and the results of the early
simulation studies, are shown in the work of Eckbo [8].
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The simulation framework is designed to accept an anticipated oil
price trajectory, and to compute the resulting demands, supplies, and
other market characteristics over the study period. Hypotheses about
likely cartel price behavior are developed using a separate set of
1behavioral models, as shown in the cloud at the upper left of Figure 1.
Thus we approach the problem with two types of models--analytical
representations of cartel behavior, and a detailed simulation of market
supply and demand. The reason for the division is analytical convenience.
The determinants of import demand and price-taker supply are varied and
complex; they involve cost and price, along with the effects of tax and
regulatory policies. To analyze the likely response of the market to one
or another price pattern, one needs a method that can accept unwieldy
functional relationships. This requirement leads to a simulation framework
for the overall analysis of market demand and supply outside the cartel.
On the other hand, study of the cartel itself, and its pricing decisions,
often involves some form of static or dynamic optimization calculation.
For this part of the analysis, drastically simplified supply-demand
relationships are needed so that many formulations of cartel behavior may
be simply and cheaply tested. The two analyses feed one another, as
shown in Figure 1.
In keeping with our emphasis on the underlying forces in the market,
the simulation framework is based on what we call a "bathtub" approximation
to the world oil market. That is, the market is treated as a single pool,
Examples of this type of model include those by Pindyck [18],
Hnyilicza, and Pindyck [10], and Cremer and Weitzman [7]. Price scenarios
based on judgment or the analysis of others also can be tested using the
simulation framework.0
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where exporters put oil in and importers draw it out. The details of the
transportation network and the refinery and distribution sector are
almost neglected. Our aim is to match demand for products with the supply
of crude, treating the intervening margin as a buffer, exogenously
determined. Data and simple models of these factors are part of the
simulation framework, as shown in the two boxes at the left of Figure 1.
We plan to add more complex representations of these subsectors only
as necessary.
The result of the overall simulation calculation is a forecast of
net demand for oil produced by the cartel core--supplemented by work on
core country supply, which is part of the overall supply-studies effort.
Together, these components form the basis for study of current market
characteristics, and forecasting of possible future developments.
The estimation of price-taker supply is a critical aspect of this
analysis, and it is to this topic that we now turn.
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2. PROBLEMS OF SUPPLY ANALYSIS
Several types of analysis have been used to explain and forecast
petroleum supply. One approach that has gained acceptance in recent years,
particularly in the United States, is the use of econometrics. This
technique has been applied in circumstances where hundreds of large
fields, each containing a number of reservoirs, have given the productive
systems the stability of large numbers, and where the depletion effect
(tending to raise costs as less of a reserve remains) has for a long time
been offset by new discoveries and improvements in technology. Recently
this balance seems to have been lost. Also, in the data used in the
econometric studies there seems to have been some ambiguity about the
meaning of reported "reserves" and changes therein, so that a given
year's reported "discoveries" bore little relation to what had actually
been found. Moreover, there was no explicit attention to costs, which
might cause a given price to be profitable in one place but not in another.
In studying supply from many areas of the world, the conditions
for econometric analysis are even less favorable than in the U.S. In
many countries the oil fields are both fewer and younger, and even the short
histories are poorly documented. Another limitation is the fact that the
price series are so fragmentary and untrustworthy. The so called "posted
prices" of the past were rendered meaningless around 1960, when they became
artifacts used for the calculation of taxes. Moreover, data on arms-length
1
For an example, see the work of MacAvoy and Pindyck [11].
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sales of crude oil are insufficient and are ridden with too many errors to
serve as a basis for econometric investigation. Were those problems not
serious enough, current prices are far outside the historical range, and the
inputs needed for development are not necessarily available in easy supply,
either at constant or predictably changing prices. Finally, econometric
calculations assumed, correctly, the existence of a competitive industry in
the United States, hence a competitive supply curve. But our task is the
modeling of a cartel, where price changes may have perverse effects on
output.
Another approach to supply forecasting, which also involves an
orderly summation of the past, is that typified by the work of the National
Petroleum Council [15], and subsequently applied by the Federal Energy
Administration [20]. Under this approach, the experience of past
exploratory drilling is summarized and a trend in the finding of reserves
per fot drilled is established. Based on estimates of the costs of
exploration and development, calculations are made of the relative attractive-
ness of exploratory activity, conditioned on some assumption about the price
of oil. Given an estimate of exploratory drilling, the forecast of barrels
added per foot drilled, a reserve-to-production ratio, and hoped-for
stability in reserve expansion in old "fully-developed" fields, it is
possible to forecast supply into the future.
Unfortunately, many of the shortcomings of the econometric approach
apply as well to the NPC-type format. In many areas of the world the
exploratory histories are poorly documented, and several of the relationships
which are required for this approach may be estimated only very approximately.
This is because many important supply areas of the world are relatively
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new, and the experience that makes the NPC method believable simply does
not exist. Moreover, the more productive potential areas in the world
often are located in offshore or otherwise inaccessible areas, and the cost
of development-production of particular resources weighs very heavily in
the supply relation, as opposed to the phenomenon of exploration and finding
which is emphasized in the NPC method.
Finally, there are the methods of resource estimation used by
oil companies in evaluating prospective areas, and in constructing global
estimates of regional or world resources. These methods, which draw on
detailed geologic and geophysical data as well as on past drilling exper-
ience, seem to be rarely used for supply estimation of the type being carried
out here. Where they are so applied, it usually is nrt possible to gain
access to the details of underlying data and assumptions. They do,
nonetheless, contain important components of concept, information and analytic
method, and use is made of these approaches below.
2.1 Key Factors in the Analysis
To a very great extent, therefore,the mechanisms we have chosen to use
are determined by what we perceive as the severity of data limitations in the
main variables. The first and fundamental problem is in the reserve data.
Viewed as an economic process, oil supply is the depletion of a stock, which
is constantly being renewed by adding new reservoirs and expanding the
limits of the old ones. "Reserves" have for years been reported by
The American Petroleum Institute (API) for the United States on a
consistent and meaningful basis [1]. Essentially they represent "money
in the bank": in effect, the organized consensus of industry personnel
as to the amount to be produced from existing installations. Elsewhere,
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one must rely on government estimates whose basis is rarely revealed,
and on the trade press, which also is essentially an informal consensus
of company opinion. The main difficulty in using non-API estimates
results from various conceptions and definitions of what is likely to
be added, how soon, to "proved reserves." In all cases, "reserves"
are not a direct measurement but an inference drawn from data on geological
structure plus observations on production volumes, pressures and tempera-
tures. There will be legitimate differences of opinion in the interpreta-
tion of such data, hence in the estimation even of "proved" reserves.
These variations are magnified as one moves from reserves proved to those
considered as "probable" in the existing cluster of reservoirs.
A considerably greater leap, and the one calling for more specialized
knowledge, is the estimation of "undiscovered reserves." Less than
a decade ago, such estimations were an exercise in method; or in the language
of a distinguished geologist, Lewis Weeks, they were merely an indication
of where an exploration department ought to go look. These estimates had,
in short, only a relative meaning, and it was a plain error to compare
them with, or add them to, proved or probable reserves in known reservoirs.
But today one can estimate the ultimate reserves for a "trend" or "play"
(i.e., a population of reservoirs, generated by a geological sequence)
provided that enough is already known about the area to furnish a reliable
sample. Such a method is presented in Section 3 below. The combination
of mathematical statistics and geologists' knowledge is not easily
created, however, and we have been able thus far to apply the method in only
one area, the North Sea. A number of estimates have been made, much more
approximately, for larger areas. These are discussed in Section 4.
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Rather than rejecting or ignoring them as not good enough, we regard them
as a considerable advance on simple extrapolation on the basis of cubic
yards of sedimentary rocks, etc.
An equally important data limitation is from reservoir engineering:
how much can be produced out of a given set of reservoirs in any given
time. In the past few years these limits have been perceived as much
more tightly binding. When the price of oil in the United States was
around $3 per barrel there was little dissent from the view that if the price
were $6, vast new reserves could be created by applying more capital and
extracting much more than the average 30 percent of the oil in place.
These hopes are not dead, but it is now seen that too little was known
Of the processes by which additional oil could be recovered from a given
reservoir, in the field rather than the laboratory. In the United States,
drilling has responded to price, but reservoirs have not.
There also has been some unpleasant learning about the amount which
can be produced per day or per year without damaging the reservoir and
lessening the ultimate recovery to the point where present value is also
less. Iran is one example. We happen to have obtained the capital bud-
gets of the Iranian Consortium for over a decade [6]. Reading them in
succession makes it plain that for years there was no felt need to know
what would happen if production were raised by several times. It was
reasonable to foresee, at prices much less than now rule at the Persian
Gulf, capacity of 10 million barrels daily (mbd). The maximum will probably
be a third to fourth less. Instead of a continuum, with higher prices
bringing out higher output rates, the marginal cost appears to become
nearly vertical in the neighborhood of 6 to 7 mbd. Given the strategic
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position of Iran among oil producing nations, this change has had impor-
tant consequences. We can only be sure it is not the only one nor the last.
Finally, there is the influence of government policies. In competitive
industries, supply and demand will be equated by price; in non-competitive
industries, by marginal revenue. World oil is a good deal more complex.
At current prices, the margin of price over costs is very great even in
the highest-cost areas. Where the industry is operated by private
companies, payments to the government greatly exceed payments to factors,
including capital charges. Hence the most important economic variable,
sometimes by factors of 10 or even 100, is the government's perception of
how great a rent exists, and how high a price they can charge without
reducing their total take. But the government take may also be in the
form of participation or joint control. There is much room for misunder-
standing and deadlock, so that a given country's actual rate of development
may be much bellow where it would be under a government which was better
informed and free to maximize, without political or ideological pressures.
Matters are simpler in those countries where the oil industry is owned
entirely by the government. As a first approximation, given knowledge of
development costs and of known and probable reserves, one can calculate the
rate of output which would maximize the present value of the current
reserves--as well as estimate the finding rate which maximizes the present
value of reserves in reservoirs to be discovered in the known areas. But
one may need to modify the approximation to accomodate cartel solidarity,
or other objectives.
In some countries, there is a backward bending supply curve, where
higher prices lead to less supply. A government may simply overreach itself,
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to take such different cases as Canada and Malaysia. Higher prices
may promise to generate so much revenue as to disrupt the desired rate
of social adaptation; as a result, the higher the price, the less
the target rate. A government with certain plans or obligations can meet
them, given higher prices, with less output; hence is willing to reduce
output or at least to accept reductions. Finally, price increases always
generate expectations of still further increases. This raises the
present perceived value of any reserves, and lowers the optimal rate of
development.
Thus the three basic determinants--reserves, development costs, and
government policies--must be put into a framework where they can be acted
upon by current and expected prices. The framework must be modular to an
extreme degree, since there is hardly a piece of the data base which
we may not need to replace at any time, as more becomes known, or as
data become outmoded.
2.2 To Approaches to Price-Taker Supply
Here we present two of the analysis methods that we are exploring. One
of these, the "'disaggregated pool analysis," is the most detailed of the
models developed and requires the most data, geological interpretation, and
computational capacity. The other, which we call "aggregated country
analysis" is among the most simple of the methods formulated. Various
extensions, modifications, and combinations of the two approaches remain
to be explored.
Though one approach is far more ambitious than the other, essentially they
are variations of the same model. That is, the supply function is based
on a simulation of the process of exploration, development, and production
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within a petroleum region. Both take account of geological data, though one
has a more complex hypothesis about geological deposition and the nature
of the exploratory process. Both take account of economic factors such
as costs and future petroleum prices, and both include an approximation of
oil-developer decisions, though the aggregated method necessarily treats
these in a highly summarized manner. Both allow for the effects of
tax regimes and other aspects of producer country oil policy, though once
again the details of tax structure must be sacrificed in the aggregated
model.
Figure 2 shows how the two analyses fit into the sequence of activities
which compose the oil production industry, and the kinds of statistics
generated. Looking first at the left-hand column, an immense store of
experience, combined with formal science and technology, gives rise to
judgmental estimates of what may be contained, and is worth producing, in
various parts of the world. The unknown areas are judged by analogy with
the known. The kinds of pools which may be generated and the relative
size distributions, constitute the estimates of "ultimate production,"
as compiled by several oil companies.
These estimates have a direct effect on the direction of geological
and geophysical prospecting. The knowledge gained thereby feeds back into
the judgmental estimates. Geological-geophysical results also determine
exploratory drilling, in new and in old areas; and the good or bad results
again feed into judgmental estimates, both of "ultimate production," and
of what may be thought, in old areas, of likely new discoveries there, i.e.,
"probable reserves."
Exploratory drilling generates dry holes, which are not necessarily bad
news, since the information about successive layers may be of great value;
ACTIVITY "RESERVES"
Accumulating fund of geological
.knowledge, areas considered
promising and unpromising, by
types and amounts of sediments.
Unknown areas appraised by
analogy to known ones.
Judgmental estimates of
accumulations and size
distributions.
:_:_;___*_______________ "Ultimate Production"
Geological and geophysical
analysis, old and new areas.
Exploratory drilling, old
and new areas.
Discoveries, old areas and
new basins, fields and pools.
Development .
Production
*
}-
>iiii~i{iiiii "Probable Reserves"
I ."Proved Reserves"
"Producing Capacity"
H Aggregated Country Analysis
Figure 2. Sequence of Oil Activities and Kinds of Statistics Generated
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it also leads to new fields in old areas, again affecting estimates of
"probable reserves" and, perhaps more weakly of "ultimate production."
At this point the Disaggregated Pool Analysis can begin. Given enough
wells drilled to furnish a reliable sample, and given geological knowledge to
certify the existence of a population from which the sample is drawn, a
forecast is made of the underlying distribution, the number of reservoirs to
be found, and their size distribution. Given knowledge of costs, prices,
and tax policies, one can make a forecast of the rate of exploratory drilling,
and the rate of development of the area.
Stated in terms of the steps of our analysis procedure, the disaggregated
pool approach is shown in the left half of Figure 3. First, an
estimate is made of the number of exploratory wells in the region.
Then the exploratory process itself must be approximated, and an estimate
made of the number of reservoirs found and their characteristics--
e.g., recoverable reserves, well productivity, depth to pay, and (in the
case of offshore areas) water depth and distance to shore. The key
variable is recoverable reserves, and here the method draws on research
on statistical analysis of the exploratory process carried out by
Kaufman and Barouch 2,3]. The economics are then calculated, reservoir-by-
reservoir. Development costs are estimated from the reservoir characteristics
and applicable tax rules, and these are combined with an evaluation of
revenues based on expected oil prices. Built into the analysis is an
evaluation of the likely production profile for reservoirs with different
characteristics. The overall supply estimate for an area is the sum of
the production profiles of its individual reservoirs; and the overall
supply from a country (or other region) is the aggregate of the results from
the various areas distinguished for analysis.
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The disaggregated pool analysis is a formal, precise, reproducible
version of what happens in industry every time a discovery is made.
Estimates of probable reserves are changed, as well as of "ultimate
production." As development wells are drilled, providing new producing
capacity and more detailed knowledge of reservoirs, the forecast of
their production is crystallized into the industry estimates of "proved
reserves."
The aggregated analysis is an attempt to tap into the calculations which
the industry has already made, which are in substance the same as the
disaggregated pool analysis. By considering prices, costs, and taxes,
the companies have already made estimates of what they expect to produce.
Recent experience indicates how fast a given amount of drilling effort
will produce the associated productive capacity, i.e. the ability to
deplete a given reservoir in a given length of time. And the "probable
reserves" and "ultimate production," both affected by recent experience,
are imprecise measures of the larger "pool" out of which are being
impounded the newly "proved" reserves. The smaller the proportion impounded
up to the present, the more is left to be taken into "proved reserves"
before rising marginal costs are felt. This is strictly analagous to
the discovery decline rate which is made explicit in the statistical analysis
at the pool level.
Once again, the approach can be expressed in terms of the explicit
steps to be worked out in Section 4. As indicated in the right-hand
panel of Figure 3, exploratory and development activity are measured in
rig years for the area in question, and an estimate is made of proved
reserves added per rig year. Instead of making a detailed study of
reservoir economics, we factor in the industry's estimates, since all
-18-
proved reserves are by definition slated to be developed. The focus is
on the amount of capacity that will be installed, considering costs
and expected oil prices. The cost data are not in the form of cost
functions, as required by the disaggregated model, but simple estimates
for each country of the capital coefficients per daily barrel of
capacity and of operating cost per barrel of production. As with the disag-
gregated analysis, separate estimates are made of supply from reserves
already in production, as shown in the lower part of the diagram. And,
of course, the method is flexible enough to take account of information
about other aspects of planned activity.
Both methods are based on the same idea of how reservoirs are
distributed in the earth and on the same sequence of industry operations.
Whether we use one or the other depends altogether on the available
data on the one side, and the money and manpower available to use
them, on the other.
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3. DISAGGREGATED POOL ANALYSIS
As noted above, the key to the disaggregated method of forecasting is
the statistical analysis of the exploratory process, and economic
evaluation of the pools that are found.l Methods have been developed
whereby a forecast can be made not only of the total recoverable reserves
to be discovered by a given level of exploratory effort, but of the distri-
bution of pool size itself and of the sequence of discoveries by size.
Pool size is a key to the economics of supply, particularly in offshore
areas (or under certain tax regimes) where small pools (and under some
conditions relatively large ones) may be uneconomic to develop. Pool
size also is a significant influence on the speed of development and the
time profile of production from reserves that are economic to produce.
3.1 Analysis of the Exploratory Process
As currently implemented, the analysis begins with a postulated
level of exploratory effort within an oil "play." A play is defined as
the pre-drilling and drilling exploration of a geological configuration,
generated by a series of geological events, and conceived or proved to
dontain hydrocarbons. The wells drilled form a statistical population.
An important element of the research is to discover the difference in
1What follows is an abbreviated version of the disaggregated method.
Its development and initial applications are described in a paper by the
M.I.T. World Oil Project [19], and the methodology is further developed
in a paper by Eckbo, Jacoby, and Smith [9].
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results that may accompany alternative ways of drawing these geographical
boundaries. For example, the North Sea results shown here treat the entire
region as a single play, but work is under way to perform the same
analysis with the area divided into four areas that correspond more closely
to the geologist's definition of a "play."
Exploratory effort is measured in terms of the number of exploratory
wells, W t , to be sunk in period t. To this drilling effort we apply
a "dry hole risk," 6t, which is the probability that an exploratory well
will fail to find a field. For purposes of the example developed
here, 6t, is held constant over the forecast period, and reflects a judgmental
estimate based on historical experience. The expected number of discoveries
in a period can then be expressed as Wt(1 - 6t). The purpose of the
analysis of the exploratory process is to determine the expected charac-
teristics of the next set of discoveries in a petroleum play over some
period to be analyzed. This is the first step in calculating the contribu-
tion that new pools may make to future supply, as shown in Figure 3.
This estimate can be combined with data on pools already discovered to
produce an overall supply forecast for the play.
The analysis of the exploratory process is based on two hypotheses
about the natural process of resource deposition. Following the work of
Barouch and Kaufman [2,3], one assumes that the number of pools in a play,
N, and their size distribution (characterized by the mean and variance, and
a ) are generated according to a probability law whose functional form
is dictated by the way in which nature deposited the oil in the
first place. Many distributions may be analyzed using the methods applied
here, but the customary assumption is that pool size in terms of recoverable
reserves, r, is a random variable, and that its density function
-21-
normal ; i.e., log r is normally distributed with mean i and variance a.
To this hypothesis about nature, then, is added another hypothesis
about the process by which oil operators search for and find these
reservoirs. Once again following the work of Kaufman and others [2,3]
the exploratory process is characterized as one of random sampling, without
replacement, in proportion to pool size, r. With these hypotheses
it is possible to predict the characteristics of discoveries number
n+l, n+2,..., N--and also total recoverable reserves in the play,
N
E r. -- if we know there have been n discoveries of size rl,...,r
j=l 3
and the order in which they were discovered.
The procedure is as follows. We can specify joint distribution function
of the n discoveries to date conditional on the parameters ,a , and N:
2D(rl, ., r , a , N) (1)
Then, using the actual sequence, rl, ..., r as one sample from this
n
distribution we can estimate (using maximum likelihood techniques)
the parameters , a2 and N. Table 1 presents the sequence of discoveries
in the North Sea, which we use as the basis of the sample calculations pre-
sented below.
Next, it is possible to specify the density function of discovery
number n+l conditional upon the exploratory history already experienced,
^2
rl, ..., r , and given estimates of the parameters i, a , and N. This
n
The estimates are treated as measures of "proved" reserves, although
the strict conditions for such a definition often have not been met (i.e.,
limiting the estimate to reserves-actually enclosed.by development wells).
'The assumption is that a small number of exploratory and development wells,
when coupled with geophysical data on structure size, gives a reasonably
accurate estimate of what will ultimately be proved in a given specific
reservoir.
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Table 1. Northern North Sea Discoveries, Recoverable Reserves
Oil Equivalent (Millions of Barrels).
Name or
Order Location Date Size
1 Cod
2 Montrose
3 Ekofisk
4 Josephine
5 Tor
6 Eldfisk
7 Forties
8 W. Ekofisk
9 Auk
10 Frigg
11 Brent
12 Argyll
13 Bream
14 Lomond
15 S.E. Tor
16 Beryl
17I cormorant
18 Edda
119 Heimdal
:20 Albuskjelli e_]_^
2/68
4/69
9/69
6/70
8/70
8/70
8/70
8/70
9/70
4/71
5/71
6/71
12/71
2/72
4/72
5/72
6/72
6/72
7/72
7/72
_ ,__A
156
180
1713
100
243
910
1800
490
50
1325
2500
70
75
500
34
525
165
98
300
357
Name or
Order Location Date
31 Ninian
32 Statfjord
33 Odin
34 Bruce
35 Magnus
36 N.E. Frigg
37 Balder
38 Andrew
39 Claymore
40 E. Magnus
41 9/13-4
42 15/6-1
43 Brae
44 Sleipner
45 Hod
46 211/27-3
47 Gudrun
48 2/10-1
49 3/4-4
50 14/20-1
51 Crawford
52 9/13-7
53 3/8-3
54 Tern
55 21/2-1
56 3/2-1A
57 Valhalla
58 3/4-6&3/9-1
59 15/13-2
60 211/26-4
9/73
12/73
12/73
3/74
4/74
4/74
4/74
4/74
4/74
6/74
6/74
9/74
9/74
9/74
11/74
11/74
11/74
11/74
12/74
1/75
1/75
1/75
1/75
2/75
2/75
3/75
4/75
Source: Beall [4], and estimates by the M.I.T. World Oil Project
as of June 1976.
Size
1000
4960
178
450
800
71
100
300
375
250
220
150
800
50
75
450
450
100
100 i
75,
150
350
100
175
175
200
50
200
200
175
I
i
. _ . _ _ 
_ _ 
-23-
we may write, defining r = (rl, ..., r), as
-- n
D(rn+l r; , N). (2)
st
r has been observed, is
E(rn+1 r) = f xD(x r; , , N)dx. (3)
The nature of this calculation can be seen in Figure 4, based on
data from the North Sea. When this analysis was done there had been
60 discoveries in the North Sea, so n = 60. The figure shows the rough shape
of the density function for the 61st discovery along with the conditional
expectation E(r6 1 r) of the size of the 61st discovery, which in this
case was 258 million barrels. The calculation for n+2, n+3, etc.
is a straightforward extension of this procedure.
One further step is necessary before proceeding to economic
and financial analysis of the reservoirs themselves. As stated earlier,
smaller pools may be uneconomic to develop, and the pace of extraction
may differ among larger pools depending on size. Therefore we need some
indication of the expected number of barrels to be found in pools of
various sizes. The data for such a calculation is contained in the conditional
distribution of Equation 3, and using this function we can calculate the
partial expectations of the numbers of barrels in reservoirs of various
sizes. To do this we define a set of k class sizes Sk , where the size
limits are defined as shown in the following table.
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Class (k) Lower Limit Upper Limit
1 a1 a 2
2 a2 a 3
3 a3 a4
Then for the (n+l)st discovery the expected number of barrels to be found
in pools in size class k, or the partial expectation of size class k, is
2+1
= J xD(x N)dx (4)
n+l,k d
The results of this calculation are illustrated in Table 2, once
again using data from our North Sea example. Four size categories are
used and the table shows the partial expectations of the number of barrels
to be discovered in each category in the next five successful exploratory
wells.
Though the table shows only the first few discoveries from a longer
sequence that must be generated for supply forecasting, several characteristics
of the process are evident in the data shown. First., most of the oil is
expected to be found in larger reservoirs, and the difference in economic
reserves which would result were the smaller size reservoirs infeasible
to develop is not great--though it is significant. Second, the table plainly
shows a process which we refer to as "discovery decline." That is, as the
province is drilled up, the expected findigg from each additional success-
-26-
Table 2. Predictive Discovery Distribution
(Millions of Barrels il Equivalent)
Partial Expectation, Pik for discovery number
Size
Category, k Limits 61 62 63 64 65
1 125 to 250 18 18 18 17 17
2 250 to 375 26 25 25 25 24
3 375 to 500 31 31 30 30 30
4 over 500 176 173 169 166 163
Expected Value, E(ri) 258 253 249 244 240
ii~ ~ ~ ~ ~ _ iiii
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ful exploratory well tends to decrease. This is the behavior one would
expect in practice, and it falls out of the analysis because the funda-
mental geological facts of life are built into the method through
the two key hypotheses introduced earlier.1
Referring again to Figure 3, the results in Table 2 constitute
the data on "reservoirs discovered." The next step, then, is to
estimate what will be done with them once their location and size
are known.
3.2 Evaluation of Reservoir Economics
There are a number of attributes of an oil reservoir that influence
its economics. The most important is recoverable reserves, and this we
predict by the methods above. Reservoir depth and (in offshore areas)
water depth and distance to shore also are imporant determinants of cost--
though these usually do not vary significantly over a region of the size
on which this analysis is based. Likewise, average well productivity
is an important factor, though it also is reasonably assumed to be
constant over the unit of analysis when a relatively disaggregated approach
is taken. These attributes--together with cost factors, tax rules, and the
expected oil price--determine the economic viability of a reservoir.
A similar phenomenon is built into the aggregated analysis as well,
where the amount added to reserves is a decling function of the number
of rig years in an area.
Note that the discovery process has been defined in terms of
recoverable reserves, and the analysis of Equations 1 through 4 carried
out apart from concern for the oil price. In principle, the amount of oil
that is "recoverable" from the oil in place is a function of price and
cost factors: at higher oil prices it is worthwhile to spend more to recover
a larger percentage of the oil. In practice, given the state of the art at
any moment, and in the relevant range of prices, elasticity of recovery
factor to price appears to be very low.
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We are concerned here with the behavior of price-taker suppliers,
and in particular with the forecasting of their response to the price
strategy of the cartel core. Since smaller reservoirs are more expen-
sive to develop, per barrel produced, one may expect that higher cartel
prices will bring more resources to the point of economic viability and call
forth increased price-taker supply. To analyze this phenomenon, we construct
a cash-flow analysis of the reservoir from '_he operator's viewpoint.
A profile of capital expenditures typical of oil reservoir develop-
ment is shown by the solid line E t in the top half of Figure 5. We have
prepared an analysis of reservoir economics to generate estimates of Et
for reservoirs of different size [9, 19]. Relationships were estimated
for the various components of capital cost (e.g., development drilling,
platform structures, platform equipment, pipelines, terminals) and of operating
cost. In this analysis of the North Sea, extensive use was made of
data prepared by Wood, Mackenzie, and Co. In addition, detailed consideration
was given to the tax systems of the U.K. and Norway.
Estimates were also prepared of the typical patterns of annual
production, Qt' from reservoirs of different size, as shown by the solid
curve in the bottom half of Figure 5. These data are then combined into
a cash flow analysis of reservoir investment and production, both to
determine economic viability and to establish the likely production
profile, reservoir by reservoir. (The dashed lines in Figure 5 represent
a simplified or "collapsed" version of development expenditures and
the associated production profile. The collapsed model is used in constructing
the aggregated model of oil supply, discussed in Section 4.)
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The result of the reservoir analysis is shown in Figure 6, once again
using data from the North Sea. The figure shows a plot of the minimum
sized pool which it is feasible to develop given an expected level of oil
price. At $6 per barrel (1976 prices), no reservoir below 200 million
barrels will be developed given current costs and tax rules in the North
Sea. At a $12 price, the marginal reservoir decreases to 90 million
barrels. Similarly, it is possible to hold price constant and calculate
the effect of changing tax rules.
3.3 Simulation of Supply
The analysis of the exploratory process, presented in Table 2,
and the evaluation of reservoir economics, summarized by Figure 6,
then constitute the building blocks for simulation analysis of'
price-taker supply. Refer again to the left-hand side of Figure 3.
Based on an estimate of exploration drilling activity (which for
this example we estimate from announced plans) a discovery sequence
generated. It represents the expected value of the reserves to be
found in pools of various sizes. These expected quantitites are
then subjected to analysis of economic viability. Submarginal reservoirs are
held aside until such time as rising oil prices or postulated revisions
in tax rules change their attractiveness for development. Those reserves
that are in pools above the minimum pool size are then converted (based
on analysis of reservoir economics) into a time profile of production.
To the estimates of supply from new discoveries, then, are added data
on expected production from reservoirs already in production or under
development. These, of course, constitute the more accurate portion of
any forecast. In the North Sea we depend heavily on Wood, Mackenzie
data for these estimates.
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The final result is a supply forecast built up pool by pool
for existing fields and (on an expected value basis) discovery by
discovery for new reservoirs. If there is more than one play in the
supply region, then the regional production is built up play by play.
The resulting supply estimtes for the North Sea are shown in Table
3, and compared with estimates of other analysts.
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Table 3. North Sea Supply Estimates (Million Barrels Per Day, oil equivalent)
1980 1985
$9 $12 $9 $12
a
Our Sample Analysis
Existing Reservoirs 2.82 2.82 2.50 2.50
Recent Discoveries 1.68 1.82 1.57 1.66
1977-78 Discoveries 0.47 0.48 1.68 1.72
Total ' 4.97 5.13 5.75 5.88
OECDb [17] 3.9 4.06 5.16 5.3
BPc [5] 3.46 6.8
Odell and Rosing c [16] 4 12
Notes: (a) 1976 Prices
(b) 1974. Based on 1972 prices of $6 and $9 in the Persian
Gulf, which are used here as proxies for 1976 prices of
$9 and $12 in the North Sea
(c) Price assumption not specified
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4. AGGREGATED COUNTRY ANALYSIS
It is only in special circumstances where we have the data needed
for the disaggregated analysis, so we are developing a greatly simplified,
but consistent, aggregated method sketched in Figure 3. It is modular,
in that the estimates for any given country, region, or field can be
replaced by more precise knowledge when available from other sources.
As noted earlier, the method is based on forecasts of rig activity
and analysis of proved-reserves added per rig year. Reserve additions
then become an input to calculations of capacity expansion and likely oil
production. Therefore we turn first to the data sources for worldwide
reserves, and the way they may be used to forecast new additions.
4.1 Analysis of Reserve Additions
As used by the American Petroleum Institute (API) the concept of
proved reserves has a definite economic meaning: a highly accurate
forecast of what will be produced from wells and facilities already
installed. Since variable costs are normally only a small part of the
total, it would take an unusually severe price drop to abort much
production. It is this concept of reserves that forms the basis of the
model developed below.
However, outside the U.S. published "proved reserve" estimates
generally include a substantial element of what the API calls "indicated
additional reserves from known reservoirs." At end-1975 in the U.S.
(excluding Alaska) this category included 5.0 billion barrels compared
with 22.7 billion proved reserves, or an additional 22% [1]. Usually
the published "proved reserves" go farther. Interesting data were
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gathered in a survey of oil companies conducted by the National Petroleum
Council. The companies made estimates of the discrepancies between API
"proved reserves" and the reserves as published by the Oil and Gas Journal
(OGJ). The results are shown in Table 4. Since the North Sea was
insignificant in 1970, the close agreement on Europe is now outdated.
Essentially, OGJ reserves for certain large Persian Gulf and African
countries include a large amount of oil not yet developed into proved
reserves, and the companies were not unanimous on its size.
We gain a different and more useful perspective on reserve estimation
by noting that reserves credited to individual developed fields fall
substantially below the OGJ national totals. Table 5 shows a comparison
of OGJ data and estimates of the largest fields as published by the
International Petroleum Encyclopedia (IPE), along with an estimate based
on the IPE figures. The estimate of proved reserves (Column 4) was
prepared by dividing IPE reserves of identified largest fields by the
portion of total country production accounted for by those fields. Finds
accounting for less than 3 percent of current production were excluded.
(In Lybia the proportion was based on cumulative not current production.)
These authors' estimates as a percentage of the OGJ figure is shown in
Column 5; the results are consistent with those in Table 4.
Prior to 1975, the percentages in column (5) would have been lower,
since OGJ in that year revised its estimates downward, and for the first
time labelled them "proved reserves" and stated that "probable and possible
reserves [are] not included." Given this definition, we should consider
that the excess of OGJ reserves over those estimated on an IPE basis
includes largely the undeveloped portions of known fields, including
some known but undeveloped reservoirs. For our purposes, the IPE-based
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Table 4. Oil Company Estimates of Proved Reserves (API Concept)
As A Percent Of Published Reserves (Oil and Gas Journal), 1970
Proved Plus
Proved Probable
Area Reserves Reserves
Latin America .97 to .99
Europe .97 to .98 Not
Africa .50 to .73 Available
Middle East .67 to .80
Total .66 to .81 .88 to .97
Rough Point Estimate about .75 about .95
Source: National Petroleum Council Committee On U.S. Energy Outlook:
an Interim Report. An Interim Appraisal by the Oil Supply
Task Group, 1972, pp. 21-24.
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Table 5. Reserve Estimates End-1975 For Selected Countries
(billions of barrels)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
IPE Identified Total
OGJ Largest Fields Estimated Column (4) as
Published Proved Percent of
Country Total Reserves Fields Reserves Reserves Column (1)
Fields
Abu Dhabi 29.5 4 4.8 6.4 21.5
Iraq 34.3 6 24.7 27.4 79.9
Kuwait 68.0 all (8) 54.6 52.2 76.8
Saudi Arabia 148.6 12 112.6 118.1 79.5
Iran 64.5 17 49.6 52.5 81.3
Nigeria 20.2 12 3.4 10.6 52.3
Libya 26.1 13 21.3 23.0 88.1
Venezuela 17.7 21 14.7 16.4 92.7
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figures are preferred for they are closer to the API definition, though
considerable judgment may be involved in making estimates for particular
countries.
Given an estimate of current proved reserves, we proceed to develop
a method for forecasting this quantity. We consider gross additions to
proved reserves in any year as an output, and rig-years as a proxy or
indicator of investment input which generates these reserves. We let Rt
be proved reserves in an area in year t, Qt be the area's production, and
RYt be rigs operating there. Then reserves-added per rig time unit, RA,
is calculated as
75 75
RA = [R5 - R2 + E Q/ C RYt. (5)75 72 t t
t=73 t=73
The numerator is gross additions to proved reserves over the 3-year period,
1972-1975, where additions include new-field discoveries, new pool discoveries,
and revisions and extensions of known fields, often from development drilling.
The denominator is the number of rig years during the same period. Rig time
is superior to feet drilled because it is a better predictor of investment,
although it is necessary to calculate RA separately for onshore and offshore
areas. Rig time includes all time-related elements, including not only
depth but also time used in moving rigs ; interruptions for lack of an
essential part or service or any other reason; unusually difficult drilling
conditions, etc.
In the Soviet Union, which operates nearly as many rigs as the United
States, 25-40 percent of the time is used in moving them. See World Oil,
August 15, 1976, p. 126.
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Equation 5 applied to a subsequent year's drilling rate yields a
forecast of reserve additions:
ARt = RYt RA. (6)
The method is a simple extrapolation of recent experience, with only inertia
(which is considerable) to justify its use.
We need to take care to avoid some obvious inaccuracies. Thus,
for example, we disregard the 1973-74 Venezuelan "marking up" of proved
reserves to the extent of about 4.5 billion barrels. The validity of the
changes seems questionable. Elsewhere, no price effect is perceptible.
More particularly, in the United States the recovery factor was not
significantly different in 1975 from 1972. It would appear that the
effect of higher prices on supply makes itself felt only by increasing
investment, i.e., drilling and reserves-added.
Of course, the yield from new investment cannot go on forever,
undiminished by the effects of depletion. Thus we define a coefficient
bt to reflect this phenomenon. Let Cum Rt encompass all past production
plus current proved reserves in year t. Ultimate recoverable reserves,
Ult Rt, are then Cum Rt plus all future additions to reserves (and,
ultimately, to production). If 1975 is the most recent year when
reserves data are available, then bt may be defined as
1petroleo Y Otros Datos Estadisticos, 1974 (Republic of Venezuela,
Ministry of Mines and Hydrocarbons), Table-page 45. Although revisions
were 5.5 billion, nearly one billion must have been contributed outside
the "markup."
2See [1], Table III, respective years.
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Cum Rt Cum R75
b [1 - t /[ - I. M
t [l Ult Rt]/ - Ult R5
And the expression for reserve additions is modified to take this factor
into account:
ARt = RYt · RA - bt (6')
As new reserves are created by drilling, they are essentially a
transfer out of the pool of ultimate production Ult Rt, for the country
or area. Thus, if cumulative production plus the amount already impounded
into reserves at any moment were the same as the ultimate production, then
the numerator of Equation 7 would be unity, bt would be zero, and no
amount of drilling could add anything to reserves. The closer the
numerator is to zero, the smaller is the fraction, and therefore the less
is the return to drilling effort, relative to the 1973-75 showing. If,
and as, the ultimate reserve estimates are changed up or down, or if we
are confronted with varying estimates of ultimate reservers, we substitute
them into Equation 7 and see what difference it makes.
This aggregated method, with national entities as building blocks,
treats as one reservoir what may be a collection of hundreds. Small
countries may be left that way. But larger ones must be, as soon as
possible, divided into rational subgroups. (In every case, we divide
between onshore and offshore.) We can illustrate the method using the
1For a fixed Ult Rt (i.e., no major change in the ultimate prospect)
the "discovery decline" is linear. As Cum Rt goes from Cum R75 to Ult Rt,
b t goes (linearly) from one to zero.t
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important new Reforma area of Mexico. In this region, the new reserves--
proved, probable and ultimate--have all been added since 1972, and therefore
we treat the area separately from the rest of Mexico. To apply to the newly
developing areas the coefficients derived from areas a half-century old
or more would have been right only by chance.
The Reforma results are shown in Table 6. The top part of the table
shows the key parameters needed for Equations 5-7; the bottom portion
presents the results.' Column 5 shows cumulative reserves added totalling
19 billion barrels (bb) by 1985. Also shown in the table is a forecast
of annual production (to be discussed in the following section) which is
based on this forecast of reserves-added. The same analysis performed
for the rest of Mexico, or for any other nation or sub-national region,
will look very much like Table 6.
In this example, an assumed constant rate of development drilling,
interacting with government estimates of proved reserves and ultimate
recovery, yields a peak production rate of 2.39 million barrels per day
(mbd) reached in 1984, declining thereafter. Yet high-ranking officials
forecast a production rate of 7 mbd in the year 2000. This implies
considerably larger reserves-added, through more drilling activity, or
more effective drilling (reduced rig time per well) than assumed in the
model. Note we have assumed a constant number of development rigs. More
development drilling would mean proportionately more production, lagged about
3 years. Thus we have identified one or two key variables in Mexico's plan
which will change, and to which we must adjust our data set accordingly.
1The Mexican authorities use a definition of proved reserves which is
very close to the strict API concept: "reserves which are expected to be
produced by existing wells through primary and secondary recovery;" from
Prospectus, Mexico External Bonds Due 1983 (September 1976), p. 17.
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Table 6. Sample Calculation of Reserves Added For Reforma Fields, Mexico
a. Reserved added, 1973-75 5.7 bb
b. Development rig years, 1973-75 99
c. Reserves added per rig year [RA] 0.58 bb
d. Ultimate recoverable reserves [Ult R75] 60.0 bb4
e. Cumulative production plus proved reserves, Reforma only,
end-1975 [Cum R751 5.8 bb
Reserves- Cumulative Ttl. Annual
ProvedAdded Proved Production
Decline serves Reserves Capacity6 (mbd) Actual
Develop. Coefficient, Added, RAt Added Depletion Rate Production 7
Yr. Rigs bt (bb) (bb) 8% 5% (mbd)
1974 33 1.000 1.91 1.91 0.121 0.077 0.113
1975 33 0.965 1.85 3.76 0.349 0.224 0.288
1976 33 0.931 1.78 5.54 -0.713 0.461 0.432
1977 33 0.898 1.72 7.26 1.030 0.677 N/A
1978 33 0.866 1.66 8.92 1.320 0.875
1979 33 0.835 1.60 10.52 1.570 1.050
1980 33 0.806 1.54 12.06 1.790 1.220
1981 33 0.778 1.49 13.55 1.970 1.360
1982 33 0.750 1.44 14.99 2.104 1.500
1983 33 0.724 1.38 16.37 2.280 1.620
1984 33 0.698 1.34 17.71 2.'390 1.720
1985 33 0.673 1.29 19.00 2.290 1.820
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Notes to Table 6
1. International Petroleum Encyclopedia (IPE), 1976, p. 222.
2. Petroleos Mexicanos, Report of Director General (March 18, 1974
and 1975), Chiapas-Tabasco only. According to Hughes Tool Co.
report, there was no substantial increase of rigs in the South
Zone from 1974 to 1975. Hence, we assume the same number of
development rigs throughout.
3. Line (a) divided by line (b); see Equation 5.
4. Minister of National Patrimony, Francisco Javier Alejo, quoted
in El Tiempo, May 17, 1976, and Petroleum Economist, June 1976,
as expecting 7 million mbd by 2000 A.D. A linear growth, and
assumption of 10 percent depletion rate in 2000 A.D. indicates
ultimate added reserves of just over 60 bb.
5. Original Reforma reserves. Differs from line (a) by 100 million
barrels already produced.
6. Assumes: (i) a lag structure whereby new proved reserves are fully
developed at the following rates: same year (t) 30%, year (t+l) 30%,
year (t+2) 40%. This estimation is based on observed lags to full
capacity in publicly-reported proved reserves. And (ii) either
(a) 8% depletion annually of pre-existing and of new capacity, which
is a weighted average of all large producing Mexico fields excluding
Reforma (as calculated from IPE), or (b) 5% depletion annually, which
is the announced objective. See IPE, op. cit., p. 191.
7. Reforma fields average production for the first six months of each year
(calculated from OGJ). IPE reports total year averages of 0.0 mbd in 1974,
0.274 mbd in 1975, and 0.553 mbd in 1976. The estimates for 1974 and 1975
are probably inaccurate. The Prospectus for Mexican External Bonds,
September 1976, is presumably authoritative, and reports 0.400 mbd
average for the month of December 1975. The 1974 PEMEX: Memoria De Labores,
p. 13, reports 0.171 mbd as the total 1974 average with a rate of 0.275 mbd
reached in December 1974.
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4.2 Analysis of New Capacity and Production Plans
We need now to go from proved reserves-added to attainable new
capacity, as indicated in Figure 3. In some areas we have the companies'
own plans. For actual forecasting, they dominate any estimates we could
make. Moreover, they are a valuable check on our own calculations, which we
make by two possible methods. We may rely again on the inertia of the
system, and base production forecasts on the historical relation of output
to proved reserves. We show this method first. Or, it may be possible to
analyze the economic forces underlying observed production behavior, and
methods of doing that also are discussed below.
But whichever method we use, application of a single depletion rate
to a reserve estimate--to obtain a production profile--is a strong
simplification, as Figure 5 shows. In the lower part of the figure,
the solid line shows a typical production profile for a field; the area
under the curve is the total proved reserves R. The dashed line is our
simplified version of oil exploitation where production jumps immediately
to an initial (and presumed peak) capacity Qp and declines at a constant
percentage rate thereafter. Once again, the area under the curve is R,
so that
T
-at
R= Q fie dt. (8)
o
As T + a, R + Qp/a; or in the limit, a = Qp/R. The question for
analysis then is: what is the value of the depletion rate, a, (and
therefore of Qp) that is appropriate for new additions to reserves?
Once a is determined it is a simple step to forecasts of supply. The
remaining issue is the lag between the time proved reserves are "booked"
and the point when the new capacity Qp is on line. In a mature producing
p
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area the lag from the former to the latter is short, but not in a new
province. We use, tentatively, 2 years onshore and 4 years offshore,
but in every case including only those fields where development drilling
has been started.
4.2.1 Historical Production-Reserve Ratio
As a first approximation, capacity plans can be calculated on the
assumption that new additions to proved reserves will be depleted at the
same rate as existing fields. Under the assumption of a uniform policy
regarding depletion, the depletion rate for an area can be calculated as
1975
a = E Qt/R 73 -75 (9)
t=1973
where 1973-75 is taken as a reasonable base period for estimation, and
R7375 is the average level of proved reserves over that period. Then for
any new addition to proved reserves in year t, the new installed capacity is
Qpt = aRt. (10)
Assuming no excess capacity is installed, production from Rt begins at
the level Qt = Qpt and declines at a percent per year.
of course, we need to worry aboutthe degree of error this simplified
model may involve. The North Sea affords a check. The end-1973 IPE reserves
(fields under development only) were less than 2 billion barrels. Preliminary
indications then (which have, incidentally, been well borne out) were of a 9
percent depletion rate. This would predict 495 tbd in 1977, somewhat over a
year too late, since 1976 and 1977 are now estimated at 585 and 1230 tbd
respectively. The end-1975 IPE developed reserves were 9.4 billion barrels,
and the same method, again assuming 9 percent, would predict 2.3 mbd in 1979,
which seems about on target so far, since late-1976 estimates are for 2.5 mbd
in 1979.
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However, the production-reserve ratio for any country is an aggregate
of many fields. Hence a simple division of national production by national
reserves may be seriously misleading. A good example is Table 7, showing
Abu Dhabi. Total national production was 1.7% of proved-plus-probable
reserves. But the bulk of those "reserves" are still undeveloped; the
working inventory is being drawn down much faster. If we confine ourselves
to proved reserves, the simple quotient Q/R = .08 gives equal weight to
every barrel of developed reserves. But our true objective is to give
equal weight to every barrel produced. If we want to estimate how much
Abu Dhabi is capable of producing next year, the Bu Hasa field (156 million
barrels) is approximately twice as important as Zakum (82 million).
Accordingly, we weight the production-reserve ratio for each field
by its production, and divide the total for all fields by the total weight.
This calculation is shown in Table 7. Use of the weighted average mean
lets us escape from some of the ill effects of poorly estimated reserves.
Since it is a better predictor of future production, it yields more
accurate cost data, which depend on our estimated production profile
(Figure 5). We have, of course, a minor sampling problem since we are
using the average of the listed fields for the whole country. However,
the finite population multiplier is a powerful ally; since we have
accounted for 77 percent of the national total of production (394/512),
the error cannot be great.
It is likely that outside the United States and Canada, reserves are
overstated and therefore decline rates understated. This is not because
of errors of optimism, but because undeveloped reservoirs in known fields
tend to be counted in.
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Table 7. Weighted Mean Depletion Rate, Abu Dhabi, 1975
(millions of barrels)
Field, Discovery Date
Asab, 1965
Bu Hasa, 1962
Mubarras, 1971
Umm Shaif, 1958
Zakum, 1964
Sub Total
Production
90
156
7
59
82
394
Unweighted Mean, total
Abu Dhabi:
Unweighted Mean,
Large Fields:
Weighted Mean:
ZQ'/ER' = 512/29,500 = 1.7%
.Q/TR = 394/4,959 = 8.0%
E[Q(Q/R)/EQ = 42.6/394 = 10.8%
Sources: Unweighted Mean, OGJ; others, IPE.
Reserves
R
500
1,289
150
1,706
1, 314
4,959
Q2 /R
16.2
18.9
0.3
2.1
5.1
42.6
.180
.121
.047
.035
.062
.080
_ _
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Table 8 shows the results of this simple approximation, using the
weighted average depletion rate as the decline rate. We have chosen
four widely differing areas to show the meaning of the concepts, and to
test two capacity forecasts. The first case is Mexico, which draws on
the data used earlier. It is assumed that Antarctica contains 20 billion
barrels available but will not be explored or developed. Hence it has,
and will have, zero reserves. Abu Dhabi drilling effort, continued at
current levels, leaves them with a 1985 production about where they are
now. Iraq attains 4.5 million barrels daily, double current production,
but less than the government's announced objective for the year 1980
or 1981.1
4.2.2 Optimal Decline Rate
The value of a observed in historical data, and calculated by
Equation 9, is the result of a particular set of past conditions of
cost, price, and tax. It may or may not be an appropriate guide to
future behavior under different conditions, and therefore we should like
to be able to calculate this parameter. We can do this by assuming
profit-maximizing behavior on the part of oil operators, and solving
for the optimal depletion rate, a*, based on estimates of cost per
barrel and future price.
First, it is assumed that the profile of capital expenditures Et
shown in Figure 5 can be collapsed to a single-period outlay I. Data
on operating costs are rather sketchy; fortunately the bulk of costs
The equating of capacity with production assumes that these cartel
nations are not forced to hold excess capacity in order to help support
the price.
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are usually capital outlays, and they can be approximated by an adjustment
to I, as shown below. Also, to begin, we assume that the capital
Coefficient, I/Q is a constant; later we consider the effects of a
coefficient which is higher at higher depletion rates.
By our simplified model of depletion, annual production is
-atQt = Qpe , and given a constant expected future oil price, P, and
discount rate, r, the net present value of a block of reserves becomes
T -(a+r)t
NPV =PQ e dt - I
P o (11)
a+r
By setting aNPV/aQ 0, we can derive the first-order conditions for
maximizing the value of the reserves, and the result can be stated in
terms of an optimal rate of depletion, a*. That is,
a* = *P r (12)
Thus the optimal depletion rate is a function of the capital coefficient
(or, more properly, its reciprocal), the oil price and the discount rate.
Before proceeding to estimate values of I/Q and a*, it is worthwhile
to question the accuracy of the simplified or "collapsed" model of oil
exploitation in Figure 5. We have reduced a complex process to only three
parameters--total proved reserves, total investment and peak output--and
we need to make sure that this model yields a reasonable approximation
to reality in view of the wide variations in production profiles among
fields, and the dependence of the results on the discount rate assumed.
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We can get a rough check on this issue by comparing the average
per-barrel cost of oil as calculated by our "collapsed" model against
actual data on expenditure and production profiles for the North Sea.
Referring to Figure 5, we can define an oil price, C, which would meet
the condition
T -rt T -rt
NPV = Et e dt- J CQ t e dt = 0
o o
(13)
This C is the supply price of oil from the reserves illustrated in
Figure 5. Or, more usefully for our purposes, C may be referred to as
the average cost per barrel of oil from a new project in the area shown.
We are able to calculate the "true" value of average per-barrel cost
from detailed data for 17 North Sea fields. Similarly, by setting
NPV = 0 in Equation 11, inserting equivalent values of the "collapsed"
parameters, and solving for P, we can calculate a comparable set of
figures for the simplified model. When we estimate C = ao + a1P
using the values of C and P thus calculated, the results are as follows:
ao
-.028 (-0.19)
-.033 (-0.18)
-.046 (-0.18)
-.055 (-0.13)
al1
0.972 (16.5)
0.989 (14.4)
1.013 (12.0)
1.067 ( 9.5)
(Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics, SE 
of regression, CV = coefficient of variation.
Wood, MacKenzie and Company, Section 2 of the
Service," February 1976).
standard error
Source of data:
North Sea
Discount 2
Discount
Rate, r
10
12
15
20
R
.95
.93
.91
.86
SE
.177
.224
.310
.487
CV
.078
.089
.107
.133
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For example, with a 12 percent discount rate, the "collapsed" unit
cost is a little higher on the average than the true cost: to get from
"collapsed" to true, one multiplies collapsed by 0.989 and subtracts
3.3 cents. Thus estimated, the calculated cost will be within 9 percent
of the true cost in about two-thirds of all cases. Whatever the discount
rate, however, the collapsed cost is a reasonable approximation to the
true cost--though this good fit depends critically on the strict definition
of reserves as "planned cumulative output from planned facilities," as
discussed above.
Analysis Assuming a Constant Capital Coefficient. Unfortunately,
outside the North Sea, we do not have anything remotely resembling these
detailed investment data. However, capital coefficients for differing
producing areas can be estimated very approximately from historical data.
Equation 14 shows the method used most frequently to calculate I. For
any country, i, we take the proportion of its rig time RY. to total
regional rig time RY. We then multiply this by the Chase Manhattan Bank
estimates of total regional production capital expenditures in the year
CMB, and divide by the capacity increase. That is,
RY1
Ii = CMB] (14)
This method overstates oil development costs, since it includes the cost
of all wells, including exploratory and gas wells. In terms of Table 5,
the cost of adding to total reserves (column 1) is included in the cost
of adding to proved reserves (column 4).
In addition to this bias, there is also year-to-year inaccuracy
caused by the lumpy nature of much development investment, especially in
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loading facilities. The investment needed per unit of additional daily
output will be exaggerated in a year with much work in process, and
conversely understated in the year facilities are completed, and begin
operating with little new money being spent. More important: the method
overstates costs in any area with an above-average percent of onshore
drilling and understates them in an area with an above-average percent
offshore, as compared with the whole region. Where this is a problem,
corrections can be made using American data.
Additions to capacity Qp may be calculated in one of two ways (or
both as a mutual check). The first is to multiply the number of newly
completed wells by the average flow rate of all existing wells. To
the maximum extent possible one should divide the completions by separate
fields.. This method tends to understate capacity increments because
new wells are always drilled with better knowledge of the reservoirs
than old wells, and to overstate increments because one would expect
lower well productivities as well interference began to be significant
and as lower-quality strata and reservoirs were developed.
our estimate of the weighted average daily flow rate per well for
each country is calculated as follows:
M Q. Qi
estimated flow rate = H ( 1)(
i=l QM iW.
where M is the number of major fields (a major field is defined as one
which accounts for at least 3% of the country's total production), is
the production of field i, QM is the total production of all major
fields, and W. is the number of producing wells in field i. Thus
Qi M Qi
is our weighting factor and - = 1.
QN i1% (
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The alternative is to take the difference in production between
year t and (t-t') and add to it the estimated loss of productive capacity
over the interim. This involves the calculation of an appropriate decline
rate, to be discussed below. Wherever there is irregular fluctuation in
output, and any appreciable amount of excess capacity, however, the
method cannot be used at all, since change in output is no indication
of change in capacity. In this paper, therefore, we used the method of
multiplying new completions by average flow rate. However, since
independent estimates of capacity are available for recent years, for
some countries, we will be able to apply the second method to them.
Table 9 shows capital coefficients for selected countries for the
year 1973. (Data for 1974, the only later year, are extremely "noisy.")
Since we have used only single-year data, the estimates are subject to
such large error factors that they should not be used for any purpose
except to check on the calculation of a*, which we now propose to do.
As an example, take a North Sea field where investment per peak
daily barrel is calculated to be $7,300. We will take r as 10 percent.
The oil price is assumed to be $12.50 per barrel, and initial operating
2
cost (at peak production) is $.95 per barrel, i.e., $347 per year over
the life of the field. We can equate this to a capital sum.
1During 1975-76, dollar denominated Eurobonds had a 9 percent yield,
which we consider as the prime business-risk rate on long-term finance. We
add 1 percent, which is the usual premium above the LIBOR (London Inter-Bank
Rate) on secured financing for the North Sea development projects.
Perhaps a better inflation allowance would start from the fact that the
sterling LIBOR was generally 4 percentage points above the dollar LIBOR in
1975-76 (9.5 and 5.5 percent respectively) before the sterling slide in
late 1976. An interesting confirmation of our 9 percent discount rate is
in the LASMO-SCOT "package" rate, in late 1976, which can be shown to
approximate 14 percent in sterling (see the LASMO-SCOT Prospectus,
February 1976).
2Wood-MacKenzie report, October 1976, Section Two, Table 1, average
for all proved fields.
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Table 9. Capital Coefficients: Dollars Per Barrel of Initial Capacity,
Selected Countries, 1973
Capital Coefficient, I/Qp
p
Country
Algeria
Libya
Egypt
Iran
Iraq
Nigeria
Venezuela
$ 758
144
483
186
147
210
1,021
5,622Brazil
Australia
Indonesia
5,185
335
Sources: Expenditures from Chase Manhattan Bank; Rig-time from Hughes
Tool Company and AAPG Bulletin; other data from OGJ,
"Worldwide Oil," annual issue, 1972-1974, and World Oil,
"International Outlook," annual issue, 1974.
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Assuming the typical North Sea 20-year life, and a 10 percent discount
rate, a stream of outlays or receipts of $347 dollars per year is worth
$347/.118 = $2,950. Investment plus operating cost now equates to a
capital sum of $7,268 + $2,950 = $10,218. Then
a* = 365 ($12.50)(.10) .10 = 111
$10,218
In fact, outside of Auk and Argyll, North Sea Q /R ratios (which are
an approximation of a*) are about 9 percent. We will see shortly why they
should be expected to be a bit lower than optimal.
As another example, we may take the hypothetical field "discovered"
by Conoco on the Georges Bank (Oil and Gas Journal, July 19, 1976, p. 60).
It contains 200 million barrels, to be drained in 15-20 years (say, 17.5)
and requires an investment of $397 million. We assume operating costs
will be slightly lower than Montrose and Heather (slightly smaller fields)
in the North Sea, i.e., $25 million annually, over a 17.5 year period,
hence with a present value of $203 million, for a total investment of
$600 million. Initial output is 60 thousand barrels per day, hence the
total capital coefficient is $10,000 per daily barrel. Conoco assumes
P = $14 per barrel, and hence a* = 12.6 percent. Conoco's estimate is
10.95 percent.
Another comparison is possible, using a paper prepared at the U.S.
Geological Survey [12]. The authors hypothesize a reservoir with a given
quantity of producible gas, reservoir pressure, price-cost parameters,
and four possible rates of water encroachment. The operator's decision
on number of wells determines the initial Qp, the ratio Qp/R, the
production profile over time, and the NPV of the deposit. Since price,
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operating costs, taxes, and the capital coefficient can be approximated
from their data, and the interest rate is given, we can calculate a* = .135.
In fact, the ratio which would maximize NPV is in the range between .157
and .173. (Although ultimate recovery is sensitive to the rate of
withdrawal, there is no well interference, and initial withdrawal is
explicitly stated as strictly proportional to the number of wells drilled.)
Variable Capital Coefficients. So far, it would appear that a* gives
values not too far out of line with reality. But the three validation
examples have been very high-cost areas. Typical capital coefficients are
only a small fraction of such values. Yet observed values of the depletion
rate are not many times those calculated; in fact they are typically lower.
Many of the low observed rates are apparently not real, because of
overstated reserves, as shown above. But we might consider the United
States, where reserves are estimates strictly on a very large sample of
reservoirs. Since 1972 when the United States essentially went on maximum
efficient rate (MER) capacity production, the ratio of production to
proved reserves has been very stable in the neighborhood of 11.8 percent.
It is expected to remain there, and production out of proved reserves to
decline at that rate, [14, p. 214].
The incentive to speed up recovery has greatly increased in 1972-75,
but the rate has stayed constant. Here we might reckon that a worldwide
average limit to the depletion rate out of proved reserves is approximately
12 percent, and in few fields will it exceed 20 percent. One obvious
reason is that too high a rate would induce gas or water breakthrough
to the well bore, leaving much oil behind, reducing reserves.
Moreover, we have so far assumed that the investment per daily
barrel remains constant regardless of how intensively the field is
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developed. In fact, in many cases the value of I/Qp may not be a
constant over wide-ranging values of a. It is in fact constant over
some range, wide or narrow, for the whole hydrodynamic system is
involved: the oil in place (including dissolved gas), any associated
gas, and water. The volume and pressure of the hydrocarbon may be a
relatively minor fraction of the whole. But usually, past some point,
the higher the output, the lower the output per well. Hence, there is
a margin where the output gained by drilling a well declines, perhaps
sharply. Therefore, we may need to make I, the investment an increasing
function of Qp/R. To do this, James L. Smith as devised the following
method.
We specify the reservoir investment function as
I = Ka R (15)
with K the proportionality constant and (epislon) the elasticity of
investment with respect to the depletion rate. Since aR Qp, a varying
£ in a R will vary the investment as a function of chosen output (i.e.,
the depletion rate). The constant K merely translates planned initial
output into dollar requirements. Thus = 1 implies constant (linear)
costs; > 1 implies increasing costs, etc.
The equivalent of Equation 11 is
NPV = X - Ka R (lla)
and the optimal decline rate can be expressed in the following relation
a* -Pr (12a)
CK(a*)
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Note that Equation 12 is just a special case of 12a, where = 1 and
therefore K = I/Qp. The a* in Equation 12 implied that well productivity
had not yet entered the phase of diminishing returns. But equation 12a
now lets us obtain a marginal cost which allows for the increasing costs
imposed by well interference, and to derive an optimal initial producing
rate accordingly.
With an estimate of , we have all the parameters needed to solve
for a*, with the exception of the constant K. By Equation 15 we can
state K as a function of I/Qp and a, and we have the historical value
of the capital coefficient, I/Q , and the depletion rate a, which are
proxies for the true values. Thus
K = [I/Q ]a (15a)
With K as estimated by 15a, we can solve Equation 12a (we use an iterative
algorithm that permits a numerical approximation) for the optimal future
depletion rate a*.
Table 10 shows some of the results, assuming the historical depletion
rate was 0.1, and for P = $10.50 and r = .12. The reason why we need this
procedure is not far to seek. The range of observed capital coefficients
is enormous. The top line, which puts the interference effect to zero
(i.e., = 1), would indicate that with particularly low capital requirements
($300 per initial daily barrel) the oil should be brought out in less
than a year. If the operator of the reservoir acts as a competitive
price-taker, then he may be restrained by the loss of ultimate recovery,
or by well interference expressed in the E coefficient. If the operator
is not inhibited, and yet is producing at "too low" a depletion rate,
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Table 10. Optional Depletion Rate (a*), for & = 0.1, P = $10.50, r = .12
Elasticity Historical Capital Coefficient (I/Q )
(£) $300 $800 $1500 $8000
1.0 1.12 0.64 0.43 0.12
1.25 0.74 0.44 0.31 0.10
1.5 0.54 0.34 0.24 0.08
2.0 0.35 0.23 0.18 0.08
3.0 0.21 0.16 0.13 0.07
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then there is slack in the system which we would expect him to use up,
by expanding output. If none of these inhibitors is sufficient, then
he may be restrained by fear of spoiling the market.
The decline in per-well productivity is a prominent feature of many
field production histories. But these are all after the fact. The basic
data that would permit a calculation of an ex-ante a* are rarely, if ever,
published. Filling this gap is an obviously high-priority task.
A final qualification: an expectation of higher prices would
ceteris paribus justify delaying output. This is a problem in optimal
control theory, and we intend to work out the functional relation.
4.2.3 The Influence of Taxes
The taxation may lower the optimal output rate. Looking again at
the North Sea example and assuming output to have been pushed to where
= 1.0, NPV is maximized by depleting at 11 percent per annum. From
Equation 11 and the data on p. 54, we can calculate the DCF rate of
return r'. That is, if NPV = 0 in Equation 14, then
P Q.
+QP = I (16)
a + r'
and in this case $4,562/(.11 + r') = $10,218 and thus r' = 0.34.
The objective of the government is to capture as much as possible
of the difference between a DCF of 34 percent, and the operator's
minimum acceptable DCF of, say, 10 percent, which is how we define
the bare cost of production. But royalty or excise payments may make
the operator change his plans, to make everybody worse off. For example,
if they simply took a 50 percent royalty, thus cutting P to $6.25, the
operator would maximize NPV at a* = .05.
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Thus the investment and the peak output would be only 5/11 of optimal.
It is not worth the operator's while to spend more money to get the oil
out faster, though he will get it out eventually. The total NPV per
barrel is less:
NPV/Q = ((5/11)(365 x $12.50)/.15) - $10,218 = $3,608
This is only 45 percent of the optimal NPV.
The operator's DCF is now: $10,218 + ($625(365)5/11) =
.05 + r' 
r' = .10 - .05 = .05
which is of course unacceptably low, and the government must prepare a
lower royalty. Where costs are very low, the dampening effect of a
royalty or excise does not matter nearly as much. Given a not-infrequent
case of poor information and mutual mistrust, one can easily write such a
scenario of deadlock as is being played out in several countries today.
An alternative would be to set NPV as the upper limit to taxation, and
aim to get some maximum practical fraction of it. The chief barrier is
uncertainty. Where there is agreement on the cost and revenue data in
our example, the government could bargain for a lump sum payment of
somewhat less than $11,500, payable in installments at the convenience
of both parties, but independent of the volume of production, so that the
operator would have no incentive to change his plan. Another possibility
Note that one barrel per day, declining at 10 percent, cumulates
to 9.09 barrels of original reserves. If we produce only (5/11) of a
barrel, declining at 5 percent, this too cumulates to 9.09 barrels.
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would be to calculate total NPV as ex?ected, then to provide a sliding
scale of government take, in order to give the operator an incentive to
reduce costs or increase output.
We may eventually devise some plan, but for the present we need only
note that since governments have not followed it, they must have reduced
the rate of production and NPV below what is attainable. Again, we follow
a simplified approach: translate the tax into a royalty-equivalent, of
the type of Equation 16, and calculate with the resulting depletion rate.
In practice this becomes very complex, because the usual arrangement is
for recovery of costs at an early stage. This reduces, often drastically,
the present-value equivalent excise, and, therefore, the impact on NPV.
4.3 Conclusion
Oil costs are everywhere only a small fraction of prevailing prices.
Hence even substantial price changes would have little effect on supply.
Moreover, the owners of the resource are governments, with more than the
usual number of degrees of freedom to choose investment and pricing policies.
Hence a model driven by some assumed price-cost-profit equilibrium will
probably not capture the essentials of the supply side of the market.
Furthermore the basic determinants of cost and supply--the investment
needed to find, delineate, and exploit reservoirs, and the time for this
operation--are so imperfectly known that the need to respect data
limitations has dominated our model. We have perforce adopted a rough
and often ad hoc scheme for predicting the amount of reserves to be
developed, calculating real production costs, and predicting government
policy on capturing the profits on incremental investment, and deciding
on the rate of growth of capacity.
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For most countries, with relatively small reserves, a rather mechanical
procedure and assumed zero supply elasticity results in no substantial
error. For those relatively few countries that matter, we hope to supplant
our first working assumptions with more realistic and complex hypotheses,
including even backward bending supply responses.
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